Banking crises and politics: a long run perspective by Chwieroth, Jeffrey & Walter, Andrew
  
Jeffrey Chwieroth and Andrew Walter  
Banking crises and politics: a long run 
perspective 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Chwieroth, Jeffrey and Walter, Andrew (2017) Banking crises and politics: a long run perspective 
International Affairs 93, (5) pp. 1107-1129. ISSN 0020-5850 
 
DOI: 10.1093/ia/iix145    
 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84368/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
	Banking	crises	and	politics:	A	long	run	perspective	
	
Jeffrey	M.	Chwieroth	
Professor	of	International	Political	Economy,	Department	of	International	Relations	
Research	Associate,	Systemic	Risk	Centre,	London	School	of	Economics	
E-Mail:	j.m.chwieroth@lse.ac.uk	
	
	
Andrew	Walter	
Professor	of	International	Relations	
Melbourne	School	of	Government,	University	of	Melbourne	
E-Mail:	andrew.walter@unimelb.edu.au	
	
Are	the	policy	responses	to	the	financial	crises	of	2007-9	and	the	political	events	that	
followed	them	exceptional?	We	show	that	over	the	course	of	nearly	150	years,	
severe	banking	crises	have	become	increasingly	consequential	for	policy	and	politics	
in	democracies.	First,	governments	have	come	much	more	likely	over	time	to	opt	for	
extensive	bailouts	and	other	policies	aimed	at	wealth	protection	during	crises.	
Second,	the	inclination	of	voters	to	punish	governments	that	are	in	office	when	
crises	occur	has	also	increased	sharply	over	time.	We	argue	that	the	main	cause	of	
these	developments	is	the	rise	of	‘great	expectations’	among	large	segments	of	
society	in	modern	democracies	regarding	the	protection	of	wealth	in	the	post-1945	
era,	especially	since	the	1970s.	From	this	time,	severe	banking	crises	returned	as	an	
important	threat	to	this	wealth,	resulting	in	rising	‘mass	pressure	from	below’	on	
governments	to	provide	costly	bailouts	and	with	increasingly	powerful	political	
effects.		
	
An	 earlier	 version	 of	 the	 paper	 was	 presented	 at	 the	 annual	 meeting	 of	 the	 International	 Studies	
Association,	Baltimore,	 22	 –	 25	 February	2017.	 	 	 The	 support	 of	 the	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Research	
Council	 (ESRC)	 in	 funding	 the	 Systemic	 Risk	 Centre	 is	 gratefully	 acknowledged	 [grant	 number	
ES/K002309/1].	This	research	also	received	financial	support	from	Chwieroth’s	Mid-Career	Fellowship	
from	 the	British	Academy	 for	 the	Humanities	and	 the	Social	 Sciences	 [MD130026],	 from	Chwieroth	
and	Walter’s	Discovery	Project	award	from	the	Australian	Research	Council	[DP140101877],	and	from	
a	 seed	 fund	 grant	 from	 the	 Melbourne	 School	 of	 Government.	 We	 also	 thank	 Shunran	 Hu,	 Mike	
Pottenger,	 Jeremiah	Brown,	Andrew	Gibbons	and	Pei	Xuan	Liu	 for	 their	 assistance	 in	 compiling	 the	
dataset.	
	
	
	
	
  
Banking crises and politics: a long-run perspective 
JEFFREY CHWIEROTH AND ANDREW WALTER 
Nearly a decade after a massive crisis engulfed the financial systems of the North 
Atlantic region, western societies continue to experience political instability, 
polarization and ‘populism’. Voters are apparently ‘angry’, distrustful of political and 
policy elites, and inclined to deliver outcomes that many judged unlikely only a 
decade ago.1 Institutions and policy norms that looked stable and deeply entrenched 
before 2007 now seem fragile, including those associated with democracy itself.2 
These developments arguably have roots that precede the financial crises of 2007–
2009.3 What seems incontestable, however, is that these crises unleashed a sustained 
period of increased political turmoil and rising contestation over economic policy.  
This paper adopts a long-run perspective to assess whether these political and policy 
developments are unusual and exceptional, or whether they are part of a historical 
pattern. We argue that over the course of nearly 150 years, severe banking crises have 
become increasingly consequential for policy and politics, and that there are dynamic 
trends in the way that democracies respond to and are shaped by such crises. First, 
                                                
1 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: 
economic have-nots and cultural backlash, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Social Science 
Research Network, July 2016); Kenneth Roth, ‘The dangerous rise of populism: 
global attacks on human rights values’, in Human Rights Watch World Report 2017 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2017), pp. 1–17. 
2 Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Christopher Walker, Authoritarianism goes 
global: the challenge to democracy (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2016); Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, ‘The democratic disconnect’, Journal 
of Democracy 27: 3, July 2016, pp. 5–17; Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, 
‘The signs of deconsolidation’, Journal of Democracy 28: 1, Jan. 2017, pp. 5–15. 
3 Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman, ‘Wealth and inheritance in the long run’, in 
Anthony B. Atkinson and François Bourguignon, eds, Handbook of income 
distribution (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2015), pp. 1303–68; Neil Postman, Amusing 
ourselves to death: public discourse in the age of show business (London: Methuen, 
1987). 
governments have become much more likely over time to opt for extensive bailouts 
and other policies aimed at wealth protection during crises. Second, voters have 
become much more likely to punish incumbent governments when crises occur.  
The main reason for these developments, we suggest, is that large segments of society 
in modern democracies came to demand that governments provide protection from 
economic downturns and the especially sharp shocks associated with severe financial 
crises—to have, that is, what we term ‘great expectations’. At first, in the wake of the 
Great Depression and the Second World War, this demand was focused on the need to 
avoid deep banking crises of the kind that occurred in the early 1930s, and on the 
need to ensure full employment and growth in incomes.4 In the period from about 
1945 to 1970, these demands were met by varying mixtures of extensive 
administrative controls on financial activity, Keynesian demand management, and 
industrial and wages policies associated with ‘embedded liberalism’. As the costs of 
these policies became increasingly apparent by the 1970s, a new set of policy ideas 
emerged that expounded the benefits of moving away from macroeconomic activism 
and towards the liberalization of markets and finance.5 In part as a consequence of the 
financial liberalization that followed, banking crises re-emerged as an important 
policy challenge and as a threat to rising societal wealth from the mid-1970s. 
Growing ‘pressure from below’ to protect this wealth helps to explain both the 
increased propensity for government bailouts and the increasingly powerful political 
effects of these crises.  
Our argument, elaborated in more detail below, consists of four novel elements. First, 
it demonstrates the central importance of changing societal norms regarding 
government policy responsibilities, specifically the reorientation of societal demands 
from the previously dominant focus on income and employment protection in the era 
of embedded liberalism to the protection of accumulated wealth. Second, it underlines 
                                                
4 Karl Polanyi, The great transformation (Boston: Beacon, 1967; first publ. 1957); 
John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded 
liberalism in the postwar economic order’, International Organization 36: 2, April 
1982, pp. 379–415. 
5 Mark Blyth, Great transformations: the rise and decline of embedded liberalism 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
the limits of democratic accountability in lowering the propensity to undertake 
bailouts. Third, it suggests that domestic political institutions acquired increased 
importance for voters primarily because they shape how governments undertake 
policy responses to crises. And finally, it provides political reasons why developed 
democracies generate endogenous tendencies to financial instability.  
The next section elaborates briefly on our claims concerning the rise and evolution of 
great expectations. The following section summarizes our argument about the 
consequences of this evolution for policy and politics during and after severe banking 
crises. The third section assesses the evidence for this argument and the final section 
considers its broader implications. 
The rise of great expectations: three eras since 1870 
To clarify our argument about the rise and evolution of great expectations, we divide 
the period since 1870 into three eras. This periodization is guided by our emphasis on 
the importance of rising societal wealth and changing societal expectations of policy 
and political outcomes. In the first era, from about 1870 until the Great Depression, 
there was a low level of effective societal demand for economic protection in 
democracies, reflected for example in the very low levels of social welfare provision 
by the state compared to those of the post-1945 era.6 Elites connected to insolvent 
financial institutions often requested government rescues in this period, but with little 
mass pressure from below governments typically responded to banking crises in ways 
that were relatively ‘market-conforming’. Governments on occasion extended support 
to distressed financial institutions, but there was no systematic or widespread 
protection of banks and their creditors.7  
The disastrous consequences of such policies, notably in the United States and parts 
of continental Europe, were demonstrated in the Great Depression and its aftermath. 
In the second era, after 1945, societies in many countries wanted far greater assurance 
                                                
6 Asa Briggs, ‘The welfare state in historical perspective’, European Journal of 
Sociology 2: 2, 1961, pp. 221–58. 
7 Charles Arthur Conant, A history of modern banks of issue, 5th edn (New York: 
Putnam, 1915). 
regarding employment, incomes, and economic and social protection generally.8 
Governments were, however, more ambiguously committed to the protection of 
wealth. This was largely assured in practice in the early postwar decades: for the most 
part, banks didn’t fail, deposits appeared safe, house prices were (by recent standards) 
relatively stable, pensions accumulated in defined benefit schemes, and currencies 
were largely fixed.9 On the other hand, in some ways most advanced democratic 
countries focused on the suppression and redistribution of wealth: postwar marginal 
tax rates on the wealthiest peaked after the war and remained high until the 1970s.10 
Financial repression was also extensive until the 1970s, when pressure for 
liberalization accelerated.11 
The third era, from the mid-1970s, was one in which financial liberalization was 
combined with new forms of financial regulation. A move towards more market-
oriented financial policies would, it was hoped, restore more rapid growth. It certainly 
produced a continued rise in the value of housing and financial assets in many 
countries, as well as greater instability in their values. Figure 1 reveals the sharp rise 
in real net private wealth per capita in a number of advanced countries after 1970. 
Much of the wealth that has been accumulated by the middle classes has been in the 
form of housing equity and pension assets, with the latter held increasingly in defined 
contribution schemes.12 As some authors have argued, this ‘wealth’ can have a darker 
                                                
8 Ruggie, ‘International regimes, transactions, and change’; G. John Ikenberry, ‘A 
world economy restored: expert consensus and the Anglo-American postwar 
settlement’, International Organization 46: 1, 1992, pp. 289–321; Blyth, Great 
transformations; Polanyi, The great transformation; Briggs, ‘The welfare state in 
historical perspective’. 
9 Robert J. Shiller, Irrational exuberance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005). 
10 Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage, Taxing the rich: a history of fiscal fairness 
in the United States and Europe (Princeton and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016). 
11 Eric Helleiner, States and the reemergence of global finance: from Bretton Woods 
to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
12 Piketty and Zucman, ‘Wealth and inheritance in the long run’. 
side when it is associated with a rising need for households to purchase expensive 
services such as education and healthcare.13 One indication of the extent of this shift 
over the long run is provided by the rate of owner-occupation in housing, which 
increased in Britain from about one-fifth to more than two-thirds of households over 
the course of the twentieth century.14 Similar trends occurred elsewhere.15  
<figure 1 here> 
As societal wealth grew rapidly in advanced countries, the threat of banking crises 
became significant once more. This intensified the demand for wealth protection that 
had always been implicit in the postwar system. In the next section, we discuss how 
governments have responded. 
The consequences of great expectations 
We argue that this growing demand ‘from below’ for the protection of wealth has had 
crucial economic, policy and political consequences in democracies that distinguish 
this second era from the first. We focus on two here. First, when banking crises do 
occur, most governments are now subject to increasing pressure from a much wider 
political coalition to provide decisive bailouts to prevent extensive destruction of jobs 
and wealth. Second, governments that fail to provide such bailouts, or do so in a 
manner that is delayed or substantially redistributive, tend to be punished far more 
than in the pre-1945 era. We also argue that, perhaps more surprisingly, in an age of 
                                                
13 Paul Langley, The everyday life of global finance: Saving and borrowing in Anglo-
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
14 Office for National Statistics, A century of home ownership and renting in England 
and Wales, UK Government Web Archive (London: The National Archives, 19 April 
2013), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/o
ns/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/a-century-of-home-ownership-and-renting-in-
england-and-wales/short-story-on-housing.html. (Unless otherwise noted at point of 
citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 20 June 2017.) 
15 United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2005 Annual Report, ReliefWeb, 1 
June 2006, http://reliefweb.int/report/world/united-nations-human-settlements-
programme-2005-annual-report.  
great expectations, even when incumbent governments do respond to crises by 
intervening to prevent economic and financial collapse, they are still much more 
likely to suffer greater electoral punishment than in the past.  
A rising demand for bailouts 
In a low-expectations world, such as that of our first era, the political constituency 
favouring minimal public intervention in crises is likely to dominate the constituency 
favouring public-sector support of failing banks. Minimal, ‘market-conforming’ 
interventions in principle provide emergency support at market interest rates only to 
banks that are solvent and would survive in normal circumstances: these are what 
Guillermo Rosas summarizes as ‘Bagehot’ policies.16 
In the kind of high-expectations world that has emerged since the 1970s, by contrast, 
more voters will favour policy interventions that minimize the potential damage to 
their employment, income and wealth—with the proviso, as we argue below, that 
these interventions do not have adverse distributional consequences. Such ‘bailouts’ 
work against market forces if the government acts to prevent or absorb losses by 
actual or potentially insolvent banks, and mitigates sharp falls in employment, 
incomes and asset values that could affect a large number of other actors, including 
households and non-financial firms. 
The main constituencies favouring limited, Bagehot-style policy responses in crises 
are taxpayers, solvent banks, the employees, creditors and debtors linked to these 
banks, and public-sector workers and welfare beneficiaries who wish to preserve their 
share of and access to public expenditure. On the other side, the constituency 
favouring public bailouts comprises insolvent banks, along with the depositors, 
creditors, investors, debtors and employees associated with such banks, and highly 
leveraged actors who stand to lose most from a depreciation of asset prices. Our claim 
is that the comparative size and influence of the pro-bailout constituency increased 
substantially after the 1970s, and especially from the 1990s. There are two main, 
interconnected reasons for this: financialization and the democratization of leverage. 
Both must be understood as long-run, evolutionary processes. 
                                                
16 Guillermo Rosas, Curbing bailouts: bank crises and democratic accountability in 
comparative perspective (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), pp. 6–7. 
John Kay describes financialization as a process of deepening and increasing financial 
complexity, characterized by ‘the substitution of trading and transactions for 
relationships, and the [associated] restructuring of finance businesses’.17 Banks have 
become steadily more important in modern economies as facilitators of the payments 
system, as brokers who match lenders with borrowers, and as managers of other 
actors’ savings and financial risk. This raises the potential for systemic risk in the 
financial system, or ‘the risk that the inability of one or more participants to perform 
as expected will cause other participants to be unable to meet their obligations when 
due’.18 
This system complexity fosters greater fragility, which in turn increases the interest of 
various actors formerly associated with the Bagehot coalition in favouring 
government action to prevent failures at any point in the system. Solvent banks, for 
example, may not be safe if failures elsewhere in the system lead to widespread asset 
price depreciation and if funding markets collapse, as occurred in September 2008. 
Thus, other actors with interests in large, complex banks also now favour public 
bailouts even of insolvent institutions—as the case of the insurer AIG in 2008 
demonstrated. Standing behind these actors were the many middle-class households 
with savings in money-market and investment funds and housing equity leveraged by 
mortgage finance. Although interconnections among banks were also present before 
the Second World War, their scope and magnitude were of a much smaller scale, and 
requests for bailout interventions often fell on deaf ears. As late as the early 1930s, 
German and American authorities stood by as large parts of their banking sector 
collapsed. 
                                                
17 John A. Kay, Other people’s money: masters of the universe or servants of the 
people? (London: Profile, 2015). See also Greta R. Krippner, ‘The financialization of 
the American economy’, Socio-Economic Review 3: 2, May 2005, pp. 173–208; 
Andrew G. Haldane and Robert M. May, ‘Systemic risk in banking ecosystems’, 
Nature 469: 7330, Jan. 2011, pp. 351–5. 
18 Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures, ‘Glossary’, 16 June 2015, 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d00b.htm?&selection=68&scope=CPMI&c=a&base=te
rm. 
Such policy stances became unthinkable after the ensuing experience of depression 
and war. When banking crises returned as significant threats to savings after the 
1970s, governments responded by providing more explicit and more generous deposit 
insurance schemes.19 Even more consequentially, the growth of housing equity and 
the move towards defined contribution pension schemes have increased households’ 
stake in the stabilization of the market value of a much broader class of underlying 
financial assets.20 Since ‘systemic’ banks and other financial institutions21 are so 
closely involved in the financing, management and trading of housing and financial 
assets, the stake of the middle classes in the protection of these firms has grown.  
Mortgage lending grew rapidly over the course of the twentieth century, facilitating 
what Jordà, Schularick and Taylor refer to as the ‘democratization of leverage’: 
‘Nearly all of the increase in the size of the financial sectors in Western economies 
since 1913 stems from a boom in mortgage lending to households and has little to do 
with the financing of the business sector.’22 The result has been rising household 
sector leverage and greater financial fragility.23 The dependence on leverage to 
                                                
19 Christopher Gandrud, ‘Competing risks and deposit insurance governance 
convergence’, International Political Science Review 35: 2, March 2014, pp. 195–
215. 
20 Sarah M. Brooks, ‘When does diffusion matter? Explaining the spread of structural 
pension reforms across nations’, Journal of Politics 69: 3, Aug. 2007, pp. 701–15; 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Pensions at a glance 
2015: OECD and G20 Indicators, 2015, http://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-
pensions-at-a-glance-19991363.htm. 
21 Those whose failure would threaten the stability of the whole financial system. 
22 Oscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor, ‘The great mortgaging: 
housing finance, crises and business cycles’, Economic Policy 31: 85, Jan. 2016, pp. 
107–40. 
23 Charles A. E. Goodhart and Philipp Erfurth, ‘Monetary policy and long-term 
trends’, VoxEU.org, 3 Nov. 2014, http://voxeu.org/article/monetary-policy-and-long-
term-trends; Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor, ‘Leveraged 
bubbles’, Journal of Monetary Economics 76, supplement, Dec. 2015, pp. 1–20; Jordà 
et al., ‘The great mortgaging’.  
acquire housing assets has been particularly marked in countries experiencing house-
price booms and increasing inequality.24 As Ansell points out, this has had important 
consequences for individual social policy preferences.25 We suggest that it has also 
meant that households in developed and many developing countries have acquired a 
much greater interest in the maintenance of the flow of credit than was the case before 
the Second World War.  
Although taxpayers, public-sector workers and welfare beneficiaries have also 
increased in number since 1945 and might have an interest in resisting costly bailouts, 
they are relatively weak sources of support for Bagehot policies. First, the costs of 
bailouts are widely distributed among these groups, who will often find it difficult to 
organize collectively.26 By contrast, the benefits reaped by the beneficiaries of 
bailouts are highly concentrated, as are the costs that Bagehot policies impose on 
them. Second, the full costs of bailouts may materialize only after considerable delay, 
and potential opponents will often lack strong incentives to mobilize against 
potentially costly bailouts at the time they are undertaken. Third, taxpayers and 
public-sector beneficiaries are also employees, consumers and (sometimes) firms: 
real-world actors have composite interests, diluting their incentives to act collectively 
to limit their tax liabilities or to maximize their share of public spending. Fourth, 
elites may be able to deflect potential opposition to bailouts by claiming that 
extensive intervention today will minimize larger public revenue and welfare losses 
                                                
24 Robert H. Frank, Falling behind: how rising inequality harms the middle class 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), ch. 5; Avner Offer, ‘Narrow 
banking, real estate, and financial stability in the UK, 1870–2010’, in Nicholas 
Dimsdale and Anthony Hotson, eds, British financial crises since 1825 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 158–73; Raghuram Rajan, Fault lines: how 
hidden fractures still threaten the world economy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010). 
25 Ben Ansell, ‘The political economy of ownership: housing markets and the welfare 
state’, American Political Science Review 108: 2, 2014, pp. 1–20. 
26 Rosas, Curbing bailouts, p. 8. 
tomorrow.27 
For all these reasons, we believe, there has been steadily growing and increasingly 
widespread demand for bailouts during financial crises. To our knowledge there are 
no cross-national longitudinal survey data on voter attitudes towards wealth 
protection. However, two national household surveys, in the Netherlands in 2010 and 
in the United Kingdom in multiple waves from 2003 to 2012, suggest that the Dutch 
and British publics have high expectations of regulators and supervisors and a 
dominant expectation that governments will opt for bailouts and other policies aimed 
at wealth protection during crises.28 In Britain these expectations persisted despite 
repeated efforts by the financial regulator over this period to articulate a ‘non-zero-
failure’ regime. Also, cross-country surveys do not indicate any overall rise in 
average support for greater government responsibility in other aspects of life, 
suggesting that the rising demand for government wealth protection is atypical.29 
Our argument does not make strong assumptions about voter rationality. Although 
most voters will find it difficult to understand the intricacies of increasingly complex 
financial systems, even unsophisticated voters can understand losses, or the threat of 
losses, to their most important asset holdings. Psychologists have shown that 
individuals are in fact unusually sensitive to even minor transactional losses as well as 
                                                
27 Two prominent recent examples were statements by British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown and US President George W. Bush in late 2008 justifying bank bailouts by 
emphasizing the need to protect households and the broader economy from a financial 
collapse. See ‘President Bush’s speech to the nation on the economic crisis’, 
transcript, New York Times, 24 Sept. 2008, and Gordon Brown’s remarks in Hansard 
(Commons), 29 Jun 2009: Column 21. 
28 Carin Van der Cruijsen, Jakob de Hann, David-Jan Jansen and Robert Mosch, 
‘Knowledge and opinions about banking supervision: evidence from a survey of 
Dutch households’, Journal of Financial Stability 9: 2, 2013, pp. 219–29; Financial 
Services Authority, Consumer awareness of the FSA and financial regulation 
(London, 2012). 
29 Authors’ analysis of the World Values Survey data on government responsibility 
(E037) for 1981–2014, 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp.  
to perceptions of unfair treatment.30 
Nor, as we elaborate in the next section, do we assume that governments 
automatically aggregate and respond to changing voter preferences. However, we do 
suggest that democratically elected governments, by virtue of electoral accountability 
and legitimacy imperatives, face at least some incentive to implement the dominant 
policy preferences of voters as they try to prevent and manage banking crises. This 
argument is consistent with a range of scholarship in related fields,31 and with 
literature showing considerable congruence between changes in public opinion and in 
policies across a range of issue areas.32 If, as we argue, households with growing 
wealth portfolios share an interest in wealth protection regardless of their partisan 
values, governments of both left and right should be increasingly inclined to provide 
bailouts in response to these constituency interests.  
A rising tendency for political punishment 
The fact that demand for bailouts has risen does not necessarily mean that all elected 
governments will provide them. Political institutions aggregate interest-group 
preferences, but they also reshape and sometimes block them. Many authors have 
highlighted the ability of polarized veto players to frustrate voter expectations 
                                                
30 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Choices, values, and frames’, American 
Psychologist 39: 4, 1984, pp. 341–50. 
31 Robert Barro, ‘The control of politicians: an economic model’, Public Choice 14: 1, 
1973, pp. 19–42; John Ferejohn, ‘Incumbent performance and electoral control’, 
Public Choice 50: 1/3, 1986, pp. 5–25; Douglas C. North and Barry Weingast, 
‘Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice 
in seventeenth-century England’, Journal of Economic History 49: 4, 1989, pp. 803–
32; Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast, ‘The democratic advantage: institutional 
foundations of financial power in international competition’, International 
Organization 57: 1, 2003, pp. 3–42; Leonard Seabrooke, ‘The everyday social sources 
of economic crises: from great frustrations to great revelations in interwar Britain’, 
International Studies Quarterly 51: 4 , 2007, pp. 795–810. 
32 e.g. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, ‘Effects on public opinion on policy’, 
American Political Science Review 77: 1, 1983, pp. 175–90. 
regarding government policies.33 Others argue that banking crises increase the level of 
political polarization because of their actual or potential distributional impact.34 A 
large negative economic shock from a crisis may also reconfigure prior voter beliefs 
about appropriate policy, increasing ideological fragmentation.35 If crises increase 
polarization and produce policy gridlock, incumbent governments may find it difficult 
to respond in the way that most voters expect.36 This is most likely to happen when 
polarized actors have access to institutional vetoes. Policy gridlock that delays or 
prevents adequate intervention can also generate spikes in risk premiums in sovereign 
debt markets, which can trigger debt crises, delay recoveries and amplify voter 
                                                
33 Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, ‘Why are stabilizations delayed?’, American 
Economic Review 81: 5, 1991, pp. 1170–88; Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Nathan M. 
Jensen and Guillermo Rosas, ‘Political liabilities: surviving banking crises’, 
Comparative Political Studies 47: 7, 1 June 2014, pp. 1047–74, p. 9; George Tsebelis, 
Veto players: how political institutions work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002).  
34 Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch, ‘Going to extremes: 
politics after financial crises, 1870–2014’, European Economic Review 88: C, 2016, 
pp. 227–60; Atif Mian, Amir Sufi and Francesco Trebbi, ‘Resolving debt overhang: 
political constraints in the aftermath of financial crises’, American Economic Journal: 
Macroeconomics 6: 2, April 2014, pp. 1–28; Anthony B. Atkinson and Salvatore 
Morelli, Economic crises and inequality, Human Development Research Paper 
2011/06 (New York: UN Development Programme, 2011); Michael D. Bordo and 
Christopher M. Meissner, Does inequality lead to a financial crisis?, working paper 
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2012). 
35 Blyth, Great transformations. 
36 Stephan Haggard, The political economy of the Asian financial crisis (Washington, 
DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000); Stephan Haggard and Robert R. 
Kaufman, The political economy of democratic transitions (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995); Shanker Satyanath, Globalization, politics, and financial 
turmoil: Asia’s banking crisis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
Thomas Oatley, ‘Why is stabilization sometimes delayed? Reevaluating the regime-
type hypothesis’, Comparative Political Studies 37: 3, April 2004, pp. 286–312. 
discontent and polarization.37 
In a low-expectations world, in which most voters do not see governments as 
responsible for preventing crises and mitigating their impact, this will matter less. In a 
high-expectations world, policy gridlock is likely to be highly consequential because 
a failure to meet the heightened expectations of voters is likely to result in severe 
electoral punishment. 
Our argument differs from the ‘clarity of responsibility’ literature on economic voting, 
which suggests that veto dispersal means voters find it difficult to assign blame to 
incumbent governments for suboptimal policy choices that produce downturns.38 We 
do not expect most voters to be forgiving of incumbent governments whose hands are 
‘tied’ by polarized institutional vetoes, because of the intensity of the demand for 
wealth protection and because of the informational disadvantage of most voters. Most 
voters will find it difficult to discern how much a bad policy outcome is the result of 
institutional constraints, leadership choice or simple incompetence.39 Thus, we argue 
that changing societal expectations of government policy have also altered the way in 
which institutional variations across democratic countries matter for the survival 
prospects of incumbent governments.40  
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Our argument does not imply that voters will reward governments who do respond to 
crises with bailouts. On the contrary, we doubt that this kind of symmetry will operate. 
First, the occurrence of a crisis is a reasonable indicator for informationally 
constrained voters of policy incompetence, a failure to prevent a substantive threat to 
something about which voters now care deeply. Second, even when banking crises are 
accompanied by extensive bailouts and macroeconomic stimuli, they generally result 
in deep and long recessions and sharp falls in asset prices.41 In democracies, such 
losses give political oppositions opportunities to portray policy interventions as 
delayed, partisan, misjudged or simply inadequate.  
A third reason why informationally constrained voters will be inclined to punish 
governments even when bailouts are forthcoming is that these often have powerful 
adverse distributional consequences. Although individual voters are likely to be most 
concerned about their potential to suffer absolute losses, there is considerable 
evidence that they are also sensitive to relative losses and attached to norms of 
fairness.42 Bank bailouts have contributed to widespread perceptions that large 
financial institutions have ‘captured’ politics and policy.43 Creditor bailouts have 
sown fears that interventions will incentivize risky future lending. Debtor bailouts—
such as government attempts to rescue highly leveraged households—are often 
resisted by those who object to ‘society’ bearing the costs incurred by irresponsible 
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borrowers. Still others worry that increases in public borrowing and extraordinary 
monetary expansions risk future inflation.  
Specific circumstances could increase such voter perceptions of unfairness. 
Financialization and the associated growth in the visibility of financial sector 
compensation in some countries in recent decades compound perceptions that bailouts 
of large financial institutions rescue the wealthy and influential. It is also possible that 
governments facing greater institutional constraints will favour selective intervention 
on terms more favourable to concentrated special interests than to diffuse unorganized 
groups, compounding perceptions of unfairness.44 
Governments and central banks generally contest these criticisms on the grounds that 
without bailouts, employment, incomes and asset prices would fall much more 
sharply, risking a depression in which most citizens would experience far greater 
losses. However, we doubt that most voters undertake such considered counterfactual 
analysis and reward governments for (possibly) ensuring that their losses are lower 
than they might have been in an alternative, hypothetical world.  
To summarize, our argument is that there is a long-run rise in demand on the part of 
broad sections of society for financial stabilization and for elected governments to 
provide increasingly extensive bailouts in more highly financialized economies. We 
argue that this will sharply differentiate both policy outcomes and political 
consequences in recent decades from those that prevailed in the era before 1945. We 
expect that governments will respond to this societal pressure ‘from below’ by 
providing more extensive bailouts. However, such interventions are still highly 
contested and governments will often respond with delays and in different ways, 
depending on a range of economic, institutional and political factors. As a result, great 
expectations ‘lift and tilt’ the bar regarding citizen assessments of government 
performance: voters have become increasingly likely to punish governments heavily 
for perceived failures to protect their incomes and wealth, while remaining disinclined 
to reward political incumbents for acting in accordance with these expectations.  
This is not quite a case of ‘damned if they do, damned if they don’t’, since the 
negative consequences for political incumbents of a failure to stabilize the financial 
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system are almost certainly greater, especially in circumstances of extensive 
financialization. Nevertheless, it is precisely in such circumstances that the electoral 
rewards are likely to be elusive, because of the visibly high cost of stabilizing large 
financial firms. Since incumbents’ fear of complete financial collapse will generally 
trump concerns about generating unwanted distributional consequences, this is a cost 
that most governments will be forced to bear. We return to this political dilemma in 
the conclusion. 
Evidence 
In exploring the consequences of the rise of great expectations, we present a series of 
stylized facts that makes use of a new long-term historical database extending from 
the mid-nineteenth century to 2015. First, we present evidence, consistent with rising 
voter pressure, that modern governments have tended to implement more extensive 
bailouts in the aftermath of financial crises. Second, we show that, in spite of this 
recent tendency, voters since the 1970s punish incumbents more severely following 
banking crises, particularly in democracies with more polarized veto players.  
Policy responses to banking crises 
In this section we explore the post-crisis policy responses of governments since 1848. 
Our analysis includes government policy responses to 81 systemic banking crises in 
democratic countries with start dates from 1848 to 2008; 30 crises in the pre-war 
period, 51 crises after 1970. We use the crisis data from Reinhart and Rogoff (R&R), 
who provide the most comprehensive data on banking crises since the early 
nineteenth century, focusing only on those crises they categorize as systemic.45 
We follow a similar procedure to Rosas, focusing on microeconomic policy responses 
to banking crises and measuring the overall tendency for governments to depart from 
a market-conforming, ‘Bagehot’ policy stance.46 Rosas counted a number of 
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microeconomic policy measures that can be categorized as either ‘Bailout’ or 
‘Bagehot’—measures that taken together either serve to prevent insolvent banks from 
failing, or alternatively that ensure that losses by such banks are crystallized and 
borne by their owners, employees and investors.  
<table 1 near here> 
Table 1 summarizes the elements of our newly constructed policy response index. The 
first column of the table identifies five crucial policy issue areas: last-resort lending, 
non-performing assets, bank recapitalization, socialization of liabilities, and exit 
policy. Entries in the next two columns refer to the policy decisions that characterize a 
Bagehot or a Bailout response.  
We then apply eight binary indicators—bank liquidity, public asset management or 
debt relief programme, recapitalization, guarantees, deposit insurance, deposit freeze, 
deposit loss and bank restructuring—to the relevant policy issue areas, as set out in 
the fourth column of table 1.47 We have drawn on various sources to develop the 
index,48 and have considered all policy responses that occur within three years after 
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Governments often employ a range of responses when responding to crises. For 
instance, even a very pro-market government may provide extensive liquidity support 
as it restructures the banking system and closes insolvent banks. Likewise, bailouts 
involving recapitalizations and guarantees often require closures and mergers of 
failing banks. Since the raw data do not reveal which indicators are correlated, we use 
the first principal component of the eight indicators as our preferred measure of 
government policy responses to banking crises.49 The resulting index ranges from 
−2.38 to 3.88, with higher values indicating a more coherent set of Bailout policy 
responses and lower values indicating a more coherent set of Bagehot policy 
responses.  
In a world where governments implement a range of policy responses, principal 
component analysis informs us how these responses co-vary along the Bagehot–
Bailout continuum. Our analysis of this index reveals, in order of importance, that 
deposit insurance, recapitalization and public asset management are the three key 
components that most strongly identify Bailout interventions, with bank liquidity and 
guarantees playing a somewhat weaker part, and deposit freezes having almost no role. 
Not surprisingly, bank restructuring and deposit losses are more strongly related to a 
Bagehot response. 
Figure 2 plots the number of systemic banking crises and the average crisis policy 
response in democracies since 1848.50 We find that before 1945 Bailout interventions 
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<figure 2 near here> 
Indeed, democratic governments in the low-expectations prewar period generally 
implemented policy responses that adhered closely to the Bagehot ideal-type. The 
average response remains below zero for nearly all of the pre-1945 period. In years 
with a relatively large number of new crises, as in the early 1920s and the 1930s, 
policy responses tend towards the Bagehot end of our index. Of the three policies our 
analysis suggests to be most strongly identifiable with a coherent Bailout response, 
we observe only one prewar case of deposit insurance (the United States in the Great 
Depression) and one instance where the government assumed responsibility for non-
performing bank assets (Germany in the final years of the Weimar Republic), and 
only a third of the cases employed recapitalizations.  
The rising tendency towards Bailout interventions from the mid-1970s, especially 
since the 1990s, is consistent with our argument that the protection of household 
wealth became an increasingly important objective of governments in this period. We 
observe a striking reversal of prewar policy trends after the 1970s, most notably with 
respect to government protection of deposits and use of the public-sector balance 
sheet to recapitalize banks and to assume responsibility for bad assets and debts. 
These defining features of Bailout interventions respectively feature in more than 70 
per cent, 66 per cent and 53 per cent of post-1970 systemic crises in democracies.  
We do not deny that ‘capture from above’ by concentrated financial and related 
interests will in some cases shape policy outcomes. However, since the degree of such 
capture can vary substantially across countries and because, as noted above, there is 
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no strong reason to assume that it was far lower in the prewar era, it is unlikely that 
this explains the broad historical trend we identify. Examining evidence from the 
United States alone, a number of authors point to the growing importance of money in 
politics and the influence of the financial sector specifically on policy outcomes.52 Yet 
we see similar bailout responses in recent crises in countries where the role of private 
money is far more restricted than in the United States.53 The same is true for a number 
of advanced democracies that vary greatly on ‘structural power’ dimensions of 
potential elite financial capture, such as the size, degree of internationalization, 
concentration and tax contributions of the financial sector.54 
The rising importance of the use of the public-sector balance sheet in policy responses 
to systemic crises also implies that adequate state fiscal capacity could be a necessary 
condition for this shift. This is probably an important reason why, as figure 2 
indicates, Bagehot responses persisted until the early 1990s. Most systemic crises in 
democracies until the 1990s occurred in poorer countries with relatively low levels of 
financialization, fiscal capacity or policy space (owing to to IMF conditionality) to 
pursue bailouts. Indeed, all the Bagehot responses in this period—of which there are 
twelve—occurred in developing countries. Nine of these countries were under IMF 
programmes at some point during the crisis window, and five had large public debt 
burdens above 70 per cent of GDP. From the 1990s, when systemic crises became 
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more concentrated in developed countries, where financialization is higher and fiscal 
capacity is less of a constraint, there was a marked trend towards Bailout responses.55 
This finding underlines the hypocrisy of advanced countries’ insistence on market-
conforming policies in developing-country crises. 
By restricting our analysis to deep and costly systemic crises, we are able largely to 
rule out economic consequences alone as responsible for the rising tendency we 
observe. Prewar crises were often just as destructive as those in the postwar era, 
sometimes more so. Yet societal expectations were much more restrained at this time, 
and governments responded to crises with less sweeping interventions. Since the 
1970s, the comparative size and influence of the Bailout constituency appears to have 
overwhelmed those constituencies favouring more limited, Bagehot-style policy 
responses.  
Political survival after banking crises 
Our primary interest in this section is to assess whether and, if so, how banking crises 
affect the hold of political incumbents on office. We constructed a new dataset of 499 
elections between 1872 and 2015 for 33 democracies in our sample. We considered 
only elections for the chief executive (e.g. presidential elections in the United States; 
parliamentary elections in Japan), focusing on the vote share of the president’s party 
in presidential systems and that of the governing party or dominant party in the 
governing coalition in parliamentary systems. 
From our full sample, we observe that 96 terms of office—19.3 per cent of the total—
experienced a crisis. The prewar sample contains 175 terms of office, of which 29.0 
per cent (50) experienced a crisis. The post-1970 period yields 324 terms of office, of 
which 14.2 per cent (46) faced a crisis.  
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To assess whether veto players condition the effect of banking crises on incumbent 
party vote share, we use the Political Constraints Index Dataset.56 Based on a simple 
spatial model of political interaction, this index captures the number of independent 
actors with veto power and the distribution of political preferences across those actors. 
It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating a greater number of veto players 
with distinct political preferences. We plot the results from a series of difference-in-
means tests that compare incumbent vote share change following crisis-afflicted and 
crisis-free (‘tranquil’) terms of office, and include 95 per cent confidence intervals 
(figure 3).  
<figure 3 near here> 
Our first main finding is that voters are much more inclined to punish incumbents 
following a banking crisis after 1970 than before that date. We failed to uncover a 
strong or statistically significant post-crisis punishment tendency in the low 
expectations prewar era. We observe significantly greater electoral punishment in the 
aftermath of a crisis in the all-periods sample. When compared to tranquil terms of 
office, incumbents presiding over a crisis suffer a negative vote swing of nearly 3 per 
cent more in the following elections.  
Yet, crucially, we observe that this effect is confined to the post-1970 period. Here, 
when compared to tranquil terms of office, the negative vote swing for incumbents is 
over 5 per cent higher in elections following a banking crisis. In sharp contrast, in the 
prewar era, incumbents did not experience a comparable electoral fate: the difference 
between tranquil and crisis-afflicted terms of office is not statistically distinguishable 
from zero. Crises appear not to be very salient for prewar voters, consistent with our 
argument that lower expectations regarding policy responsibility then prevailed. We 
also note that in our statistical tests we considered restrictions on suffrage, but find 
that these are not a decisive factor shaping our results.  
This finding can be illustrated with reference to the banking crises of 1907 in the 
United States and Canada, where incumbent parties had been in power for nearly a 
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decade. Government policy responses were very limited, including in the United 
States where the crisis was more virulent.57 Sharp recessions ensued in 1908, when 
GDP fell by 4.7 per cent in Canada and 8.2 per cent in the United States. Despite this, 
neither incumbent political party lost power in the elections held that year in both 
countries.  
After 1970, incumbent governments suffered much harsher verdicts from voters 
following a crisis. Electoral losses were particularly pronounced during the crises of 
the 1980s in Latin America and in western democracies after 2008. In the 1980s, 
incumbent parties in Argentina (1989), Bolivia (1989), Colombia (1982 and 1986), 
Uruguay (1989) and Venezuela (1982) saw their vote share plummet after presiding 
over banking crises and debt problems. In the 1985 election in Peru the incumbent 
Popular Action Party experienced the sharpest decline recorded during this period, 
with a negative vote share swing of nearly 37 per cent. 
In the aftermath of the 2007–2008 crisis, incumbents saw their vote share fall in 
Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. By far the largest collapse of electoral support 
was observed in the 2011 election in Ireland, where the governing party Fianna Fáil 
lost office when its vote share fell from 41.6 per cent in 2007 to 17.4 per cent. Spain’s 
Socialist Party suffered a 15.5 per cent negative swing and loss of office in the 2011 
election, the worst result for a sitting government in that country since 1982. 
Our second main finding is that such electoral punishment is strongest in democracies 
with more polarized veto players. In low veto player environments, by contrast, we 
found no significant decrease in the incumbent vote share after a banking crisis. These 
findings are once again confined to the post-1970 period.58  
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Figures 4 and 5 show the results for incumbent parties and coalitions, respectively. 
Here we compare changes in incumbent vote shares in crisis and crisis-free terms in 
both ‘high’ and ‘low’ veto player environments (defined respectively as one standard 
deviation above and below the sample mean).  
<figures 4 and 5 near here> 
In the full sample, when comparing incumbents in high veto player environments, we 
found that those presiding over a banking crisis lose on average more than 5 per cent 
more of their vote share than their crisis-free peers. We find no such significant 
difference in low veto player environments. The veto player environment thus appears 
to condition the impact of banking crises on political incumbents’ hold on office, in 
ways that are inconsistent with the clarity of responsibility hypothesis.  
Further investigation reveals that this impact is again confined to the post-1970 era. 
Figures 4 and 5 reveal a notable shift in the reaction of voters to crises across different 
veto player environments since 1870. In the modern era, the negative vote share 
swing for incumbents in high veto player environments is more than 12 per cent 
higher following a crisis than in crisis-free terms. In low veto player environments, 
we find no significant differences between crisis-afflicted and crisis-free terms. In 
addition, we see no similar significant asymmetric effect across different veto player 
environments in the prewar period.  
Why did these institutional variations across democracies become so much more 
important after 1970? The most plausible explanation is that governments that face 
more political constraints in a severe banking crisis are less able to deliver the 
decisive intervention that many voters now demand. Substantially higher levels of 
financialization and leverage have also made governing in the wake of crises much 
more difficult and contentious.59 In such circumstances, greater policy contestation 
may have increased the likelihood that institutional vetoes will be used to block 
decisive interventions. In addition, higher inequality, often visibly associated with 
financialization, may have exacerbated political polarization and increased the 
importance of institutional vetoes. Inequality may also be further increased by costly 
interventions that require later reductions in welfare spending, emphasizing their 
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negative distributional consequences for many voters.60 Government attempts to meet 
society’s great expectations are thus fraught with risk. 
This point can be illustrated by the contrasting responses and electoral fates of 
incumbent centre-right parties in the United States and Sweden following the recent 
financial crisis. Bermeo and Pontusson conclude that in the United States, elite 
political polarization and supermajoritarian features of the political system 
‘profoundly shaped (and hampered)’ the policy response after January 2008.61 
Congressional delay in approving the Bush administration’s Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) in September 2008 was one consequence, as was the absence of 
bipartisan agreement on substantive action on household mortgage modifications. The 
policy interventions that were agreed appeared to many voters selective and highly 
redistributive, bailing out large banks while leaving millions of American families 
subject to foreclosures and employment losses.62 In Sweden, despite a higher number 
of potential vetoes, ‘elite consensus facilitated a swift and effective crisis response’. 
There, the stimulus packages adopted by the centre-right Alliance government in 
2008 and 2009 were relatively uncontested.63 Whereas the US Republicans were 
heavily defeated in the 2008 presidential elections, in 2010 Swedish voters returned 
the Alliance to power with an increased vote share—the first time a centre-right 
Swedish government had achieved this in almost a century. 
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Conclusion 
We have provided evidence to support our argument that the rise of societal 
expectations regarding financial stabilization over the past century has had powerful 
consequences for both economic policy and political survival. Although we do not 
deny that financialization is associated with the increased influence of financial sector 
interests over politics and policy, our argument identifies and emphasizes a different 
political mechanism. Rather than ‘elite capture’, our theory suggests instead that 
rising demand for the protection of incomes and accumulated wealth by the middle 
classes—‘mass capture’—has been a powerful force behind financialization, rising 
financial instability, government bailouts of large financial firms and asset markets, 
and political turnover since the 1970s. Elite capture is unlikely to explain trends 
common to a variety of democracies over such a long period. Indeed, it is only by 
stepping back and taking a long-run perspective that we can see the powerful impact 
of these changing mass societal expectations on politics and policy.64  
What are the broader consequences of these developments? Over the long run, 
changing policy responses have probably altered the way that actors behave, 
including their propensity to take on risk. This has in turn helped to reshape both the 
financial system (including its degree of fragility) and the political system. 
As the scope of great expectations has expanded, elected governments face a growing 
number of policy dilemmas, including trade-offs between objectives of financial 
stabilization and of growth. On the one hand, if governments try to promote growth 
via financial liberalization, this poses persistent risks to accumulated wealth through 
cycles of asset price booms and busts. On the other hand, if they seek to achieve 
financial stability through extensive financial repression, this risks suppressing 
growth, incomes, employment and wealth.  
Since electoral cycles are usually shorter than financial cycles, we believe that 
financial repression is politically unsustainable over the long run. The economic and 
political importance of the financial sector and associated interests also inhibits any 
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return to extensive financial repression. The pattern of modern debate on financial re-
regulation after major banking crises is instead for early radical calls for much more 
stringent regulation to be displaced by arguments that this would impose too great a 
hindrance on growth. The debate since 2008 has been no exception, so that the most 
likely outcome will be a modest increase in financial regulatory stringency and a 
continuation of the processes of financialization and rising leverage that have 
characterized the post-1970 era.  
This tendency may have encouraged long-term financial instability, partly because 
liberalized and complex finance creates extensive opportunities for innovative actors 
to gain competitive advantage by arbitraging regulation,65 and also because rising 
societal pressure for bailouts when crises occur has encouraged governments to 
underwrite past decisions by actors to take on greater risk and leverage. Paradoxically, 
then, the rise of great expectations has helped to reinforce the very threat to financial 
stability that citizens and governments fear.  
This suggests a political interpretation of the ‘Minskian’ cycle of credit boom and 
bust. Citizens and firms are unwilling to forgo the perceived benefits of 
financialization and leverage on the assumption that governments will intervene to 
underwrite the financial system and protect their assets when periodic crises occur. 
But this increases financial fragility and the probability of future crises. ‘Policy 
success’, in such circumstances, may consist in governments getting through electoral 
terms without experiencing costly crises; or, failing that, undertaking crisis 
interventions that restore the functioning of the financial system at substantial public 
cost, followed by recession and austerity.  
What are the implications for everyday politics? If financialization, leverage, crises 
and interventions are endemic, distributional conflict will remain acute. To the extent 
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that this is partly responsible for increasing political polarization and mistrust of 
government, this implies continuing challenges for democratic politics.  
The pressure of great expectations has also eroded traditional right-wing support on 
principle for more market-conforming policies. An illustration is provided by the 
George W. Bush administration’s reversal of its earlier opposition to using public 
funds to recapitalize banks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
‘Government owning a stake in any private US company’, Hank Paulson, then 
Treasury Secretary, explained, ‘is objectionable to most Americans—me included. 
Yet the alternative of leaving businesses and consumers without access to financing is 
totally unacceptable.’66 Other examples of right and centre-right governments 
intervening extensively in 2008–2009 include those of the Christian Democrats in the 
Netherlands, Venstre in Denmark, Fianna Fáil in Ireland and the Independence Party 
in Iceland. 
Centre-left and left-wing governments that historically baulked at the prospect of 
rescuing large banks during crises have similarly had to succumb. Prominent recent 
examples include the governments of the Labour Party under Gordon Brown in the 
United Kingdom, the Social Democratic Party in Austria and the Socialist Workers’ 
Party in Spain. Left and centre-left political parties represented in European coalition 
governments that provided extensive financial sector bailouts have included the 
German Social Democratic Party and Luxembourg’s Socialist Workers’ Party.  
This combination of crises, financialization and bailouts may pose particular political 
challenges to left-wing political parties, further eroding their support base over the 
longer run. In addition to the ideological strain produced by left and centre-left parties 
undertaking bailouts and adopting post-crisis austerity policies, as financialization and 
leverage grow their redistributive effects may increase over time, contributing to 
relatively greater losses for low-income voters.67 This could increase these voters’ 
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propensity to defect from such parties and may help to explain why far-right parties 
tend to be the biggest political beneficiaries of banking crises.68 
Finally, we may ask: is it better to be in government or in opposition when crises hit? 
As we have argued, banking crises provide a gift to opposition parties, which can 
blame their occurrence on incumbents and portray interventions as delayed, unfair, 
misjudged and/or inadequate. In single-party government systems, then, being in 
opposition at this point has unambiguous advantages, as Britain’s Conservative Party 
demonstrated over 2008–2010. Uruguay’s systemic crisis in 2002 provides a less 
well-known case of opposition strategy in a high veto player environment. When the 
crisis struck, the opposition centre-left Frente Amplio (FA: the ‘Broad Front’) played 
the role of ‘loyal opposition’ in passing emergency legislation that was a condition for 
securing a loan from the United States that helped to stabilize the banking system in 
the face of an 11 per cent collapse in output.69 By the time of the 2004 election, 
Uruguay’s economy was experiencing a strong recovery. The FA’s strategy of 
collaboration and limited dissent enabled it to claim some credit for the country’s 
stabilization while pointing to the traditional ruling parties’ responsibility for the 
crisis. The election result—a monumental swing of 43.5 per cent away from the 
incumbent party—brought the FA to power in Uruguay’s first government not 
composed by one of two traditional leading parties.  
The second-worst position, after that of the incumbent in a single-party government, 
is probably that of a potential opposition party in a coalition government. As the 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD) found to its cost in 2010, being in 
government as a minority partner when the crisis hit and supporting interventions in 
the same manner as Uruguay’s FA robbed it of the ability to shift blame to Angela 
Merkel’s Christian Democrats. In the end, however, both governments and opposition 
parties must make the best of their circumstances when crises occur. In an age of 
financial fragility and great expectations, in which new movements are sweeping 
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aside political party systems that have been stable for decades, no political party can 
be fully secure.  
  
Figure 1: Real net private wealth per capita, selected countries 1870-2014, constant 
2015 US dollars and PPP exchange rates. Source: www.WID.world, accessed 6 
March 2017. 
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Figure 2: Average Policy Response Index for R&R Systemic Banking Crises in 
Democracies, 1848 – 2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Systemic Banking Crises and Changes in Incumbent Vote Share, 1872 - 
2015. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4: Banking Crises and Changes in Incumbent Party Vote Share Across Veto 
Player Environments, 1872 - 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5: Banking Crises and Changes in Incumbent Coalition Vote Share Across 
Veto Player Environments, 1872 - 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
